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This paper proposes a “bottom up” approach to link public investment programs with a 
class of macro models recently developed to quantify Strategy Papers for Human 
Development (SPAHD) in low-income countries. The methodology involves establishing 
constant-price projections of investment outlays (disaggregated into infrastructure, 
education, and health), spending on maintenance and other goods and services, 
salaries, and user charges. These estimates are incorporated in a SPAHD macro 
framework to calculate, under alternative scenarios, domestic financing, foreign 
borrowing, and aid requirements. The impact on growth and indicators associated with 
the Millennium Development Goals are also evaluated. Illustrative applications, based on 
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 3   
I.  Introduction 
 
Promoting a large increase in public investment is increasingly recognized 
as a critical step to spur growth, reduce poverty, and improve the quality of 
human life of low-income countries. Indeed, a number of recent reports—such as 
those of the United Nations Millennium Project (2005), the Blair Commission 
(2005), and the World Bank (2005)—have called for a “Big Push” in public 
investment in education, health and infrastructure, financed by generous debt 
relief and a large increase in foreign aid, given the limited ability of the poorest 
countries to raise resources through domestic taxation or borrowing.
1 
 
More specifically, the declaration adopted at the UN World Summit of 
September 2005 called on all countries“ to adopt, by 2006 and implement 
comprehensive development strategies to achieve the internationally agreed 
development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs).” What it means, essentially, is that the logic of aid allocation should be 
aligned squarely on what countries need to achieve their development objectives. 
This “new view” of aid raises a host of political economy issues (involving, for 
instance, the role and nature of conditionality), which have not been fully 
resolved; as a result, it is too early to tell whether donors’ behavior will be 
adjusted to respond to the new environment. 
 
At a more technical level, however, a key issue raised by the “new view” of 
aid relates to the need to assess quantitatively requirements for foreign 
assistance, given a public investment program (PIP) and its impact on growth 
and the MDGs. Dwelling on some of our previous work, this paper proposes a 
“bottom up” approach to linking public investment programs with a class of macro 
models recently developed to quantify Strategy Papers for Human Development 
(SPAHD) in low-income countries. The methodology involves establishing 
                                                 
1Infrastructure plays a particularly important role in this context, in part because of its 
impact on health and education outcomes. See Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) for a detailed 
discussion of the role of infrastructure in the growth process, and Agénor and Neanidis (2006) for 
a formal analysis in an endogenous growth framework. 4   
constant-price projections of investment outlays (disaggregated into 
infrastructure, education, and health), spending on maintenance and other goods 
and services, salaries, and user charges. These estimates are then incorporated 
into an appropriate macro framework to calculate, under alternative scenarios 
regarding domestic financing and foreign borrowing, aid requirements.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a 
formal description of the methodology. Section III applies the methodology to 
Niger, using an illustrative PIP. This section also shows how calculations of aid 
requirements depend on the assumed path of tax policy. Section IV provides 
some final remarks. We emphasize the fact that to ensure that the PIP is realistic 
and based on reliable data, substantial improvements in project assessment 
capability within the public sector may be required in many countries. 
 
 
II.  Methodology 
 
The methodology that we propose in this paper builds on the SPAHD 
macroeconomic framework developed by Agénor, Bayraktar and El Aynaoui 
(2006), and extended by Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2005), and Agénor, 
Bayraktar, Pinto Moreira, and El Aynaoui (2005). This class of models, which is 
now commonly referred to as SPAHD macro models, provides a unique and 
tractable framework for accounting for the links between aid, public investment, 
the supply side, and some key human development indicators—including the 
poverty rate, malnutrition, the infant mortality rate, percentage of population with 
access to safe drinking water, the literacy rate, and life expectancy.
2 
 
                                                 
2See the Appendix for a more detailed presentation of SPAHD macro models. The 
emphasis on public investment and the supply side in these models dwells on the more advanced 
class of IMMPA models, described in the collection of studies edited by Agénor, Izquierdo, and 
Jensen (2006). See also Agénor (2005) for a broader perspective on the design of macro-
economic models for poverty analysis.  5   
We begin by describing formally the treatment of public investment and 
budget financing in a SPAHD framework in the case where aid is treated “above 
the line” and considered exogenous.  We then explain how to re-arrange these 
equations to solve residually for aid needs, given a PIP built from micro data. 
 
1.  Case of Exogenous Aid 
 
In a standard SPAHD framework, aid (defined as grants only) is treated 
“above the line” and taken as exogenous, whereas all components of borrowing 
(concessional or not) are treated as financing items. In existing models, there is 
also an econometrically-estimated linking public investment in real terms, IG, with 
aid and domestic resources (taxes, for short): 
 
IG = F(TAX,AID)/PQT,                                         (1) 
 
where AID is foreign aid (measured in domestic currency), TAX total taxes, and 
PQT the equivalent of the after-tax consumer price index. This equation is 
generally specified in proportion of GDP, but we use a “level” specification to 
simplify the presentation. Note also that in some applications, nonlinearities in 




Components of public investment consist of health, education, and 
infrastructure (ignoring, for simplicity, any residual category). Given the overall 
level of public investment determined from (1), these components are then 
calculated as fixed fractions: 
 
IGh = κh·IG,                                                   (2) 
 
                                                 
3See for instance the SPAHD model for Niger in Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2005). 6   
where h = edu, hea, inf. In this expression, κh ∈ (0,1), and Σhκh = 1. Thus, we 
have also IG = ΣhIGh. 
 
As discussed in Agénor, Bayraktar, Pinto Moreira and El Aynaoui (2005), 
we account for the possibility that a fraction of the resources invested in 
investment projects may not have a positive impact on public capital. Specifically, 
we follow the linear specification proposed by Arestoff and Hurlin (2005), which is 
based on a modified version of the perpetual inventory method: 
 
KGh = αh·IGh-1 + (1 - δh)KGh-1,                                     (3) 
 
where αh ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of efficiency of investment category h, 
and δh ∈ (0,1) the rate of depreciation of capital h. The case of “full efficiency” 
corresponds therefore to αh = 1. 
 
  Total government spending at current prices is given by 
 
GTOT = WG·LEG + PQT·(CG + IG) + INT,                                (4) 
 
where WG·LEG  denotes the wage bill, CG total spending on goods and services, 
and INT interest payments on domestic and foreign debt. 
 
Real spending on goods and services, CG, consists of maintenance 
expenditure, MAINT, and other spending: 
 
CG = MAINT + CGoth.                                         (5) 
 
In turn, maintenance spending, measured at constant prices, is taken to 
be proportional to total depreciation of physical capital: 
 
MAINT = θM(Σhδh·KGh-1),                                          (6) 7   
 
where θM > 0.
4 
 
As noted earlier, the government budget balance treats aid (grants) above 
the line, and all borrowing (concessional or not) below the line: 
 
GBAL = TAX + AID – GTOT.                                        (7) 
 
Financing of the budget deficit is either from domestic borrowing, DB, or 
foreign borrowing, measured in domestic-currency terms, ER·FG: 
 
- GBAL = DB + ER·FG.                                              (8) 
 
This equation is generally solved for the level of foreign borrowing 
(assumed to be at concessional terms). 
 
Treating aid as exogenous in a typical exercise with a SPAHD macro 
model is warranted if the objective is, for instance, to assess whether large aid 
inflows (viewed as an exogenous impulse) can lead to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, given that demand- and supply-side effects tend to operate in 
opposite direction. However, to calculate aid requirements, the logic of the 
solution process described earlier must be amended. 
 
2.  Public Investment Programs and Aid Requirements 
 
To alter the model structure outlined above and endogenize aid, the first 
step is to drop equation (1). We then treat IG as predetermined (taken from the 
PIP), and solve for aid as the budget equilibrating item. The starting point is thus 
                                                 
4Note that the coefficient θM may be greater than unity, if maintenance activities involve 
not only replacing the physical capital that is deteriorating but also other expenses associated 
with the delivery of these services (for instance, the cost of running a maintenance agency). See 
the discussion below. 8   
the assumption that the PIP provides detailed multi-annual projections of capital 
outlays, maintenance costs, other spending on goods and services (such as, in 
the case of education, books, pencils, and uniforms), wages and salaries (such 
as teachers’ pay, in the case of education), and the direct revenues (fees) 
derived from public investments, all at constant prices. 
 
First, suppose that the PIP provides estimates of required public 
investment needs in education, health, and infrastructure. In terms of the 
previous notation, the public investment program implies that 
 
IG
PIP =  ΣhIGh
PIP.                                            (9) 
 
Using (3), the stock of public capital in category h is thus given by  
 
KGh = (1 - δ
h)KGh-1 + αh·IGh
PIP.                                     (10) 
 
Second, suppose that the PIP provides data on “new” requirements for 
maintenance at constant prices, NR_MAINT
PIP. Using (6), total spending on 
maintenance is thus  
 
TMAINT
REV = θM·(Σhδh·KGh-1) + NR_MAINT
PIP,                   (11) 
 
with KGh determined from (10). 
 
Third, suppose that the PIP provides estimates of spending on goods and 
services other than maintenance at constant prices, NR_CGoth
PIP. Using (5) and 




REV + CGoth  + NR_CGoth
PIP.                        (12) 
 9   
Fourth, suppose that the PIP provides estimates of wages and salaries 
that will recur as a result of the new investment at constant prices, N_SAL
PIP. 
Total wage payments at current prices is thus 
 
SAL
REV = WG·LEG  + PQT·N_SAL
PIP.                               (13) 
 
Fifth, suppose that the PIP provides estimates of user charges at constant 
prices that accrue directly to the budget (possibly through transfers from public 
enterprises), denoted by USER
PIP.
5 Total government resources at current prices 
excluding aid, GOVR, are thus 
 
GOVR
REV = TAX + PQT·USER
PIP.                                 (14) 
 
Substituting (9), (12) and (13) in (4) implies that total government 




REV + INT + PQT·CG
REV + PQT·IG
PIP.                 (15) 
 
For a given path of domestic and foreign borrowing (DB and ER·FG, 
respectively) aid requirements associated with the PIP can thus be calculated 
residually from equations (7), (8), (14), and (15): 
 
AID
PIP = - (DB + ER·FG) - GOVR
REV + GTOT
REV.                      (16) 
 
The foregoing discussion shows that the degree of efficiency of 
investment has only indirect effects on aid requirements. In particular, the lower 
is the efficiency parameter α in equation (10), the lower will total maintenance 
spending be in equation (11). From (12), (15) and (16), aid requirements will be 
                                                 
5User charges may be higher for some components of infrastructure (such as 
telecommunications or, to a lower extent, toll roads) than others (such as health services, for 
instance). It should also be kept in mind that even a small bill on public utilities may represent a 
substantial burden for poor households. In establishing projections in that area, it is therefore 
better to err on the side of caution. 10   
lower than otherwise. However, to the extent that lower efficiency of public 
investment translates into lower growth and revenues, aid requirements will 
increase. Thus, the net effect of an increase in efficiency on foreign assistance is 
in general ambiguous. 
 
In the foregoing presentation, we have assumed that the PIP incorporates 
estimates of projected spending on total wage payments at constant prices, 
N_SAL
PIP. In principle, these estimates should be derived from the projected path 
of an “effective” average wage (at constant prices) on new hires, N_RWG
PIP, 
multiplied by the increase in public sector employees, N_∆LEG
PIP. Thus, instead 
of (13), total wage payments at current prices would be given by 
 
SAL
REV = WG·LEG  + PQT·N_RWG
PIP·N_∆LEG
PIP.                   (13’) 
 
  From the point of view of fiscal accounting, decomposing the projected 
wage bill of the public sector into movements in an effective wage and changes 
in employment may not matter too much, given that both variables are treated as 
predetermined in our approach. However, from the perspective of the labor 
market, this decomposition could be quite important. The reason is that hiring by 
the public sector affects the composition of labor supply in the economy, and 
could therefore have significant implications for the private sector. A sharp 
increase in the demand for educated labor by the government, for instance, could 
drive wages up in the private sector. In turn, this may translate into higher prices 
and lower output. Similarly, higher wages on new hires in the public sector could 
have an adverse “signaling effect” on wages in the private sector. Thus, higher 
public investment could generate negative externalities, which could mitigate the 
positive supply-side effects accounted for in SPAHD macro models. 
 
  Finally, it should also be noted that our methodology may involve some 
element of “double counting” when it comes to evaluating maintenance spending. 
Indeed, SPAHD models calculate maintenance requirements endogenously, by 11   
relating them to depreciation of physical capital (see equation (6)). Thus, any 
new investment, whether in infrastructure, health, or education, to the extent that 
it translates into an increase in the corresponding capital stock, will automatically 
generate an estimate of maintenance outlays. A legitimate question, therefore, is 
whether a PIP estimate of maintenance outlays is at all needed. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that the estimate produced by the SPAHD model can 
be viewed as corresponding strictly to the expenditure needed to avoid physical 
depreciation of public assets. Assuming that the (average) depreciation rates 
included in the SPAHD framework are accurate estimates, this would require 
setting θM = 1 in equation (6).  The maintenance expenditure accounted for in the 
PIP could therefore be viewed as corresponding mostly to the other outlays 
associated with the delivery of maintenance activities, such as the cost of running 
a maintenance agency (excluding salaries and other compensation). In practice, 
these expenses could be very difficult to separate from the category “other 
spending on goods and services” identified in the PIP, so that some “double 
counting” may be inevitable. 
 
3.  Link with a Medium-Term Budget 
 
  It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that implementing the above 
methodology can produce a complete set of fiscal accounts, including a Medium 
term Budget Framework (MTBF) as long as PIP estimates are available for 
several years. This is important, given that several observers (including donors) 
have emphasized that elaborating more advanced Medium-term expenditure 
frameworks is a key priority for strengthening the PRSP process (see, for 
instance, German Development Cooperation (2005)). The foregoing approach 
goes a step further by providing a complete medium-term budget, with 
simultaneous determination of aid requirements. 
 
  In summary, the methodology proposed in this paper for linking PIPs and 
SPAHD macro models can be summarized as follows: 12   
 
Step 1. Establish the public investment program from the “bottom up”, and 
provide estimates at constant prices (that is, at prices of the base period t = 1) of 
a) investment in health, education and infrastructure; b) maintenance needs 
associated with these new investments; c) other spending on goods and 
services; d) wages and salaries; and e) estimate user charges that would accrue 
directly to the budget, for periods t = 1,…, T. 
 
Step 2.  Incorporate estimates of investment, maintenance and user 
charges in the model; given assumptions for the path of domestic and foreign 
borrowing, solve the model for aid requirements for periods t = 1,…, T. 
 
Step 3. If aid requirements are deemed feasible (in the sense of 
representing a realistic basis for discussion with donors), go to the next step. If 
not, go back to step 1 and revise (downward) spending estimates contained in 
the public investment program.  
 
Step 4. Calculate the medium-term budget  for t = 1,…, T, with aid 
requirements shown as residual. Repeat steps 1 to 3, If necessary, with 
alternative assumptions about domestic and external financing. 
 
 
III.  Applications 
 
  To illustrate the functioning of the framework described in the previous 
section, we apply it to Niger, using the SPAHD framework developed by Pinto 
Moreira and Bayraktar (2005). With 63 percent of the population living below the 
poverty line, and 34 percent considered as extremely poor, Niger is the second 
poorest country on earth. Despite recent improvements, social indicators remain 
abysmal, and among the weakest in the world. Infrastructure indicators are also 
poor, as in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. Various observers have taken the 13   
view that to stimulate growth and improve human indicators, a large increase in 
public investment is needed. 
 
We begin by describing an illustrative PIP for Niger. We then determined the 
implied aid requirements. We conclude with an examination of the impact of 
alternative assumptions of tax effort on these requirements. 
 
1.  An Illustrative Public Investment Program, 2006-15 
 
  Table 1 shows an illustrative PIP for Niger, with all flows measured at 
constant 2004 prices. In the table, public investment includes not only the three 
categories identified earlier (education, health, and infrastructure) but also a 
category “other”, which represents a relatively small share of total capital outlays. 
In a typical SPAHD application, this component is generally treated as a flow 
only, with no impact on the stock of public assets. 
 
The 2005 values of the capital expenditure series are taken from the 
baseline table estimated by Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2005). The growth rate 
of public investment in infrastructure is assumed to increase gradually from 3 
percent in 2006 to 6 percent in 2009, and to remain at that level up to 2015. 
Regarding maintenance expenditures in infrastructure, user charges, and wages 
and salaries, we assume that they represent 5 percent of investment in 
infrastructure. Other spending on goods and services is assumed to account for 
one percent of capital outlays in infrastructure. 
 
The growth rate of public investment in education is assumed to grow at 
the lower rate of 2 percent in 2006, 3 percent in 2007, and 4 percent from 2008 
to 2015. While maintenance expenditures in education, user fees, and other 
spending on goods and services are equal to 1 percent of capital expenditures in 
education, wages and salaries are taken as 5 percent of this component of 
investment.  14   
 
The growth rate of public investment in health is taken to be equal to the 
growth rate of investment in infrastructure. Similarly, the shares of maintenance 
expenditures in health, user fees, other spending on goods and services, and 
wages and salaries are assumed to be equal to the corresponding shares in 
investment in education. Finally, the growth rate of other public investment is 
assumed to be equal to a constant value of 1 percent throughout the simulation 
period. For this component, whereas the shares of maintenance expenditures 
and user fees is taken to be zero, the shares of other spending on goods and 
services, and wages and salaries are set at 1 percent of investment.  
 
Total public capital expenditure data are obtained by adding up the 
components of capital expenditures. As shown in Table 1, investment in 
infrastructure represent about two-thirds of total investment, investment in 
education about 10 percent of that total, and investment in health about 18 
percent. In proportion of GDP (as shown in the bottom part of Table 2), public 
investment represents about 5 percent in the base period. 
 
2.  Aid Requirements and the Medium-Term Budget Framework 
 
We now turn to a calculation of aid requirements using the methodology 
described earlier and the SPAHD framework for Niger described by Pinto Moreira 
and Bayraktar (2005).
6 To project exogenous variables, we follow the 
assumptions underlying the experiments in that paper. These involve, for 
instance, setting the rate of growth of export and import prices to the same value, 
imposing an effective interest on foreign borrowing of 0.5 percent per annum. 
Domestic borrowing is kept at 1 percent of GDP (the value observed in the base 
period) and foreign (concessional borrowing is limited to 2 percent of GDP). Tax 
rates that are exogenous are also kept constant initially. 
 
                                                 
6The paper also provides details about parameter estimates and the calibration process. 15   
We also assume that public investment is only partially efficient, in the 
sense that capital outlays in education, infrastructure, and health do not serve to 
increase one to one the public capital stock. Specifically, we assume that only 
half of investment flows turn into increases in public capital and impose αh = 0.5 
for all h in equation (10). This is consistent with Pritchett’s (1996) estimate that 
half of all capital outlays are wasted in developing countries. It also corresponds 
to the mid-point of the range of values estimated by Arestoff and Hurlin (2005). 
Although this choice has no effect on the calculations of aid requirements (which 
are based on the flow data provided by the PIP), they do affect macroeconomic 
outcomes, namely, the economy’s growth rate and the MDGs.
7 
 
Table 2 shows the aid requirements calculated by the model and the 
associated medium-term budget framework for the period 2006-15.  The results 
show that with (domestic and foreign) borrowing constant as a share of GDP, 
and a more or less constant tax effort (of about 10 percent of GDP), expenditure 
of about 25 percent of GDP, aid requirements drop slightly over time from 12.5 
percent in 2006 to 11.4 in 2015. In proportion of tax revenues, aid falls from 125 
percent in 2006 to 109 in 2015, but in proportion of total public investment, aid 
rises from about 241 to 250 percent during the same period. 
 
The impact of the PIP-cum-aid package on the MDGs is shown in Table 3. 
The headcount index decreases in the “best” case (a consumption growth 
elasticity of -1.5) from about 63 percent in 2006 to 38.5 percent in 2015. 
However, with a consumption growth elasticity of -0.5, the poverty rate drops by 
less than 10 percentage points over the same period. The literacy rate (defined 
as the ratio of educated labor to total population) increases from 20.3 percent in 
2006 to 27 in 2015, as a result of an increase in public investment in education 
and infrastructure combined with an increasing number of teachers. Whereas 
infant mortality drops from 150 in 2006 to 118 in 2015, malnutrition prevalence 
                                                 
7Of course, experiments involving a higher efficiency assumption parameter (perhaps as 
a result of reforms aimed at improving governance) could also be performed.  16   
drops from 40.6 to 36 percent during the same period. In the model, these 
improvements are a result of a combination of factors—reduction in poverty, 
increased public investment in health, and higher GDP and private consumption 
per capita.
8 For similar reasons, life expectancy also increases (albeit slightly), 
from 46.9 in 2006 to 49.5 in 2015.  The percentage of population with access to 
safe water rises from 58.1 percent in 2006 to 61.4 percent in 2015 as a result of 
increasing public investment in infrastructure.  
 
In sum, the projections show that MDG indicators improve quite sensibly 
in Niger; the composite MDG index (which is defined as a geometric average 
with base 2005 = 100 for convenience) shows a significant overall improvement, 
increasing by 20.1 percentage points. But despite these improvements, and 
given the illustrative PIP considered here and other assumptions about the 
environment that Niger is likely to face in the coming years, the MDG of halving 
poverty and malnutrition would not be achieved by 2015. Everything else equal, a 
more ambitious program of public investment would be required—possibly 
leading to absorption problems. 
 
3.  Tax Reform and Aid Requirements 
 
The foregoing analysis was based on the assumption that the exogenous 
effective direct tax rate (which is assumed to be under the control of the 
authorities) in the SPAHD model was kept constant at its base period value.
9 
Thus, tax effort, as measured by the ratio of the associated revenues to GDP 
was taken to be constant.  
 
To highlight the link between the calculation of aid requirements and tax 
policy, we consider an alternative scenario. Specifically, we assume that the 
direct “effective” tax rate, which amounted to 1.9 percent of GDP in 2004, is 
                                                 
8The elasticity used to link poverty and the MDGs corresponds to the “neutral” case of 
unity. Adjusting this parameter is of course straightforward. 
9The effective indirect tax rate was assumed to be endogenously determined, as in the 
original model (see Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2005)). 17   
gradually increased, by one percentage point per annum beginning in 2007 for 5 
years. Thus, the direct tax rate rises gradually to 6.9 percent of GDP in 2011. 
While this exercise is, again, for purely illustrative in nature, it is a sensible policy 
to consider in the case of Niger, where tax revenue ratios are relatively low 
compared to other countries at a similar level of per capita income. 
 
The results of this experiment are illustrated in Tables 4 and 5. As shown 
in Table 4, the revenue-to-GDP ratio rises gradually over time, from about 10 
percent to about 16 percent now. With the expenditure and borrowing ratios 
remaining practically the same, the implication is a significant drop over time in 
aid requirements, from 12.5 percent in 2006 to 7.9 percent in 2010 and 6.6 
percent in 2015. As a proportion of tax revenues, aid requirements drop 
considerably, from 124.8 percent in 2006 to 41.6 percent in 2015 (compared to a 
drop to 109 percent with a constant direct tax rate). As a proportion of total public 
investment, they also drop quite dramatically, from 241 to 137 percent during the 
same period (compared to an increase to 250 percent in the previous scenario). 
However, in terms of the MDGs, the impact is much less significant; poverty, in 
the neutral elasticity case drops now from 63 percent to 50.3 percent (compared 
to 45.5 percent in the previous case) between 2006 and 2015, whereas the 
composite indicator improves from 102 in 2006 to 118 in 2006 (compared to 122 
previously). The reason, of course, is that the increase in the direct tax rate 
lowers disposable income, which in turn slows the growth rate of private 
consumption. As a result, the fall in poverty is less significant, and other human 
indicators improve by less as well. Put differently, reducing aid dependency over 
time through domestic tax reform entails a cost, in terms of the speed at which 
the MDGs can be achieved—even though a significant portion of the increase in 
domestic resources is used to finance productive spending.  
 
Of course, this apparent trade-off between increasing the share of 
government spending financed through domestic resources and poverty results 
from the fact that, because there is only one category of households in the 18   
model, the increase in the tax rate is implicitly assumed to affect equally all 
households in the economy. In practice, low-income households would be largely 
exempt from direct taxation; their consumption pattern would not be affected, 
implying that the overall effect of higher taxes may well be a lower poverty rate 
(relative to the case considered here).  
 
At the same time, however, upper-income households may be more 
inclined (or capable) to evade tax payments following an increase in the direct 
tax rate, thereby reducing (marginal) revenues from the tax. As a result, public 
investment may be lower than otherwise, which may dampen growth as well as 
the increase in disposable income and consumption expenditure. The net effect 
on poverty may therefore be ambiguous. These considerations are worth bearing 
in mind when designing “scaling down” scenarios, following a period of sustained 
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IV.  Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to develop a “bottom up” approach to 
linking public investment programs with a class of macro models recently 
developed to quantify Strategy Papers for Human Development (SPAHD) in low-
income countries. This class of models, developed by Agénor, Bayraktar and El 
Aynaoui (2006) and extended by Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2005) and 
Agénor, Bayraktar, Pinto Moreira, and El Aynaoui (2005), provides a tractable 
framework for accounting for the links between aid, public capital (diaggregated 
between education, health, and infrastructure), and the supply side. By linking 
the model through cross-country regressions to indicators of poverty, 
malnutrition, infant mortality, life expectancy, and access to safe water, we obtain 
a consistent framework for evaluating the impact of policy decisions on the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
 
The methodology proposed in the paper involves establishing constant-
price projections of investment outlays (disaggregated into infrastructure, 
education, and health), spending on maintenance and other goods and services, 
salaries, and user charges. These estimates are then incorporated in the SPAHD 
macro framework to calculate, under alternative scenarios regarding domestic 
financing and foreign borrowing, aid requirements. The impact on growth and 
indicators associated with the Millennium Development Goals were also 
calculated. Illustrative applications, based on a SPAHD model for Niger, were 
used to highlight the impact of tax reform on aid requirements. 
 
The “bottom up” approach proposed in this paper needs assurance about 
the quality and productivity of public investment. This would require building up 
the institutions and capacity to conduct objective cost-benefit analyses of 
proposed investment projects, to structure contracts and evaluate bids, and to 
monitor the implementation of public investment projects. This may also involve 20   
the compilation and reporting of improved data, including estimates of the public 
capital stock and its depreciation rate. 
 
An issue that needs to be further explored in the context of our proposed 
approach is the treatment of contingent liabilities, which may be sizable if some 
investments involve private participation. Although this may be an issue of limited 
importance for the low-income countries that we have in mind, in general 
excessive commitments can create problems. In principle, actual and potential 
costs for the government implied by a private-public partnership (PPP) contract 
should be taken into account when calculating aid requirements.  Indeed the net 
present value of scheduled government payments under PPP contracts, less any 
contractual receipts such as concession fees—both discounted using a risk-free 
interest rate—should be counted as a liability and added to the initial stock of 
government debt.
10 Our methodology implies that, through their effect on debt 
servicing, these commitments would affect the calculation of aid requirements.
11 
At the same time, however, it should be borne in mind that adequate estimates of 
contingent liabilities are difficult to establish. 
 
                                                 
10 More precisely, it is the expected liability— that is, the stock of guarantees weighted by 
the probability that they will materialize—that should be added to the public debt. 
11Alternatively, they would require the generation of larger future primary surpluses (or 
smaller primary deficits to ensure debt sustainability. 21   
Appendix 
SPAHD Macro Models: Structure 
and Link with the MDGs 
 
The simulations presented in this paper are based on a macroeconomic 
model for Niger described in Pinto Moreira and Bayraktar (2005). The model is 
part of the SPAHD class of macro models first discussed by Agénor, Bayraktar 
and El Aynaoui (2006).
12 
SPAHD models are designed to capture the links between foreign aid, the 
level and composition of public investment, the supply-side effects of public 
capital, growth, and poverty, in the context of a “typical” low-income country. 
They focus on the fiscal and supply-side effects of aid, as well as the stock and 
flow effects of public investment---which is disaggregated into education, 
infrastructure (roads, electricity, telecommunications, and so on), and health---
while accounting at the same time for potential congestion effects associated 
with the use of public services. They are designed, in particular, to examine how 
debt relief, as well as increased aid and aid-funded levels of public investment, 
possibly coupled with changes in the allocation of public expenditure, can 
stimulate growth and lead to sustained poverty reduction. Because SPAHD 
models contain only one category of households, they are silent on distributional 
issues. However, this is very much by design; the fundamental premise of 
SPAHD models is that the ability to engage in substantial income or asset 
redistribution in low-income countries (in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere) is 
limited for a variety of reasons (including the low level of income to begin with), 
and that the key to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is a 
sustained increase in growth rates. 
The first part of this Appendix describes the macro component of the 
SPAHD model for Niger and how it is related to poverty. The second part 
explains how macroeconomic variables (namely, income and consumption per 
capita), as well as poverty, are linked with the other MDG indicators. 
On the production side, the economy produces one composite good, 
which is imperfectly substitutable to an imported good. Domestic production 
requires effective labor, private capital, and public capital in infrastructure and 
health.
  The stock of private capital is calculated by applying the standard 
perpetual inventory method (see OECD (2001, Chapter 5)).
13 In the case of 
public investment, however, the model accounts for the possibility that a fraction 
of the resources invested may not translate into an increase in the public capital 
stock—a point emphasized by Prichett (1996) in the context of developing 
                                                 
12The acronym SPAHD stands for Strategy Papers for Human Development, a term 
proposed by Agénor, Bayraktar, Pinto Moreira, and El Aynaoui (2005) as more encompassing 
than the current “PRSP” concept. 
13We thus assume that it is the flow of services associated with a given capital stock that 
affects production, and that this flow is proportional to the prevailing stock. See OECD (2001) for 
a discussion of alternative methods for calculating a volume index of capital services. 22   
countries in general. As discussed in the text, we follow the linear specification 
proposed by Arestoff and Hurlin (2005). 
In addition to public capital in infrastructure improving the productivity of all 
private factors used in production, public capital in health improves the quality of 
labor employed in production. Effective labor is a composite input produced by 
the actual stock of educated labor and public capital in health. In order to take 
into account congestion effects in the provision of health services, the stock of 
public capital in health is scaled by the size of the population. To account for 
congestion effects in domestic production, lagged output is used as an indicator 
of the intensity of use of public infrastructure. Domestic output is allocated 
between exports and domestic sales, based on relative prices. 
Population and “raw” labor grow at the same constant exogenous rate. 
The transformation of raw labor into educated labor takes place through the 
education system, which provides schooling services free of charge. A key input 
in this process is a composite public education input, which is a function of the 
number of teachers and the stock of public capital in education. But production of 
educated labor requires not only teachers and public capital in education but also 
access to infrastructure capital.
14 A congestion effect is introduced by dividing the 
stock of public capital in education by the quantity of raw labor. Educated labor is 
employed either in the production of goods, or as government employees. 
Income from production is entirely allocated to a single household. This 
household holds the totality of domestic public debt and receives interest 
payments on it  ; it also receives government wages and salaries, unrequited 
transfers from abroad, and pays interest on its foreign debt. Disposable income is 
obtained by subtracting direct taxes from total income. Total private consumption 
is a constant fraction of disposable income.  
Private investment is a function of the rate of growth in domestic output, 
private foreign capital inflows, and the stock of public capital in infrastructure. The 
latter variable captures the existence of a “complementarity” effect—by 
increasing the productivity of private inputs, or by reducing adjustment costs, a 
higher stock of public capital in infrastructure raises the rate of return on capital 
and leads to an increase in private investment.  
Total demand for goods sold on the domestic market is the sum of private 
and public spending on final consumption and investment. Goods bought and 
sold on the domestic market are the combination of imported goods and 
domestically-produced goods, in standard Armington fashion. The domestic good 
is imperfectly substitutable with the foreign good, and its relative price is 
endogenous. As a result, the model allows the user to analyze potential Dutch 
disease effects that may be associated with large aid flows in a fixed-exchange 
rate economy such as Niger, through increases in domestic prices. 
Aid, defined only as grants, is linked to the government budget through 
various channels. The government collects taxes and spends on salaries, goods 
and services, interest payments, and accumulates public capital. Aid is 
                                                 
14As discussed by Brenneman and Kerf (2002), and Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006), 
many recent microeconomic studies have found a positive impact of infrastructure services on 
educational attainment, possibly through an indirect improvement in health indicators. 23   
accounted for “above the line.” The deficit is financed through domestic 
borrowing and foreign borrowing (concessional or not). Taxes are defined as the 
sum of direct, domestic indirect, and international (import) taxes. Total public 
investment is allocated (using fixed fractions) between health, education, and 
infrastructure. The effective direct tax rate is negatively related to the aid-to-GDP 
ratio, and positively to total government expenditure. This specification captures 
therefore an adverse (moral hazard) effect of foreign assistance on fiscal effort. 
The effective indirect tax rate is also negatively related to aid. Current non-
interest expenditure on goods and services is assumed to be constant as a 
proportion of GDP.  
Total public investment is positively related to both tax revenue (a 
measure of the capacity to raise domestic resources) and foreign aid. To account 
explicitly for the implications of a higher capital on stock on recurrent spending 
(and thus financing needs), maintenance expenditure is related to depreciation of 
all stocks of public capital.  
The financing constraint of the government implies that the budget 
balance is financed through domestic and foreign borrowing. From the household 
budget constraint, private savings is determined by a constant saving rate and 
disposable income. 
The balance of payments is obtained by subtracting foreign interest 
payments and changes in net foreign assets of the central bank from the sum of 
net exports, private and public capital flows, aid, and unrequited transfers from 
abroad. The stocks of private and public foreign debt are obtained by adding the 
current period capital flow to the debt level of the previous period.  
The price of the composite good is a function of the price of the 
domestically-produced good and the domestic-currency price of imports (defined 
as the product of the nominal exchange rate and the world price of imports, 
inclusive of tariffs). Market equilibrium requires equality between total supply of 
goods on the domestic market and aggregate demand for these goods, which in 
turn determines the equilibrium (composite) price. In the Niger SPAHD model, 
the price of the domestic good on the domestic market is assumed to adjust only 
gradually to its equilibrium value. Finally, the domestic-currency price of exports 
is equal to the exchange rate times the world price of exports. 
Six of the MDG indicators are integrated: the poverty rate, the literacy rate, 
infant mortality, malnutrition, life expectancy, and access to safe water. These 
MDG indicators also interact with each other, in a way that is made precise 
through a series of cross-country regressions. 
The poverty rate is linked directly to the macroeconomic model either 
through partial growth elasticities relating a poverty indicator to consumption, or a 
household survey.  The first method consists of relating the poverty rate (as 
measured by the headcount index) to the growth rate of real private consumption 
per capita, as derived from the aggregate component of the model. In the 
absence of more precise estimates for Niger, we use three partial elasticity 
values in the simulations reported in the text: a “neutral” or central value of -1, a 
“low” value of -0.5, and a “high” value of -1.5. 24   
The literacy rate, which is defined as the ratio of educated labor to total 
population, is also a direct output of the model. It is only an approximation to the 
conventional definition, which relates to the proportion of the population aged 15 
years and over which is literate.  
All other MDG indicators (malnutrition, infant mortality, life expectancy, 
and access to safe water) are linked to the model through cross-country 
regressions, which allow us to alleviate the lack of observations at the level of 
individual countries. We use a cross-section estimation technique, in order to 
focus on long-run relationships. Given that all the MDG indicators considered 
here tend to change slowly over time, this appears to be a more sensible strategy 
than using, say, dynamic panel techniques. These regressions are discussed in 
Agénor, Bayraktar, Pinto Moreira, and El Aynaoui (2005).   
Malnutrition prevalence is linked to the model through real consumption 
per capita and the poverty rate. While increasing consumption per capita reduces 
the incidence of malnutrition, an increase in the poverty rate raises it. Infant 
mortality is inversely related to poverty, and positively related to real income per 
capita and public spending on health. Thus, declining poverty may not be 
sufficient to decrease infant mortality if public investment in health is not 
increasing sufficiently.  
Public spending on health also has a positive effect on life expectancy, 
which can be viewed as a “summary” indicator of the goal of combating diseases. 
Besides public investment in health, lower infant mortality rates and higher real 
income per capita also tend to increase life expectancy.  
The share of population with access to safe water is taken to be a function 
of population density, real income per capita, and public spending on 
infrastructure. The effect of population density on access to safe water is positive 
because the cost of building infrastructure capital tends to drop with higher 
density. Similarly, increasing real income per capita raises the share of 
population with access to safe water, possibly as a result of “demand” pressures. 
Public investment in infrastructure raises access to safe water—both directly and 
possibly indirectly as well, through its impact on real income per capita. 
To provide a synthetic view on progress toward achieving the MDGs, the 
Niger SPAHD model also calculates a composite index by taking an unweighted 
geometric average of all the individual indicators defined earlier—the literacy 
rate, life expectancy, access to safe water, as well as the inverse of the poverty 
rate (as obtained in the “neutral elasticity” case), malnutrition prevalence, and 
infant mortality. Thus, a rise in the index indicates overall progress toward 
achieving the MDGs. 
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A. Infrastructure
           1. Capital Expenditures 63.9 66.5 69.8 74.0 78.4 83.1 88.1 93.4 99.0 105.0
           2. Maintenance expenditures 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.2
           3. Other spending on goods and services 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0
           4. Wages ans salaries 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.2
           5. User fees 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.7 5.0 5.2
B.  Education
         1. Capital Expenditures 10.5 10.8 11.2 11.7 12.1 12.6 13.1 13.6 14.2 14.8
         2. Maintenance expenditures 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
         3. Other spending on goods and services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
         4. Wages ans salaries 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
         5. User fees 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
C.  Health
         1. Capital Expenditures 17.5 18.2 19.1 20.2 21.4 22.7 24.1 25.5 27.0 28.7
         2. Maintenance expenditures 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
         3. Other spending on goods and services 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
         4. Wages ans salaries 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4
         5. User fees 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
D.  Other
         1. Capital Expenditures 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.2
         2. Maintenance expenditures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
         3. Other spending on goods and services 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
         4. Wages ans salaries 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
         5. User fees 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
E.  Public Capital Expenditure (A+B+C+D) 
         1. Capital Expenditures 98.5 102.1 106.8 112.7 118.9 125.4 132.4 139.7 147.4 155.6
         2. Maintenance expenditures 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.7
         3. Other spending on goods and services 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6
         4. Wages ans salaries 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.6 5.9 6.3 6.6 7.0 7.4 7.8
         5. User fees 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.7
Memo Items (in % of capital expenditures) 
   Infrastructure (Total) 64.9 65.1 65.3 65.7 66.0 66.3 66.6 66.9 67.2 67.4
   Education 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.5
   Health 17.7 17.8 17.8 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.3 18.4
   Other 6.7 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.7
Years
Table 1
Niger: Illustrative Public Investment Program, 2006-15
(in billions of CFA francs, at 2004 prices)2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
A.  Total revenue (excluding grants) 213.4 241.8 274.0 309.2 346.7 386.1 427.3 470.2 514.8 561.3
B.  Total expenditure (1+2+3+4) 543.5 608.8 682.2 762.1 846.5 935.1 1027.9 1125.2 1227.3 1334.8
    1.  Spending on goods and services 339.7 384.3 434.1 487.6 544.0 603.2 665.1 729.8 797.5 868.5
         Maintenance 30.5 35.1 40.0 45.3 51.0 57.0 63.4 70.2 77.5 85.3
        Other spending on goods and services 309.2 349.2 394.1 442.3 493.1 546.2 601.7 659.5 720.0 783.2
    2.  Wages and salaries 81.9 92.2 103.6 115.7 128.6 142.0 156.0 170.5 185.7 201.6
    3.  Investment (public investment program) 110.6 120.3 131.9 145.3 159.6 174.6 190.5 207.3 225.2 244.4
        Health 19.6 21.4 23.5 26.1 28.8 31.6 34.6 37.9 41.3 45.0
        Infrastructure 71.8 78.3 86.2 95.4 105.3 115.7 126.8 138.7 151.3 164.8
        Education 11.8 12.7 13.8 15.0 16.3 17.6 18.9 20.3 21.7 23.2
        Other 7.4 7.9 8.3 8.8 9.3 9.7 10.1 10.5 11.0 11.4
    4.  Interest payments 11.4 12.0 12.7 13.5 14.3 15.3 16.4 17.6 18.9 20.3
        Domestic debt 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.3 3.7
        Foreign debt 10.2 10.6 11.1 11.7 12.3 13.0 13.8 14.7 15.6 16.6
C.  Overall fiscal balance, excluding grants (A - B) -330.1 -367.0 -408.2 -452.9 -499.8 -549.0 -600.6 -655.0 -712.5 -773.5
D.  Borrowing 63.8 72.0 81.3 91.3 101.7 112.7 124.2 136.1 148.6 161.6
    Domestic 21.3 24.0 27.1 30.4 33.9 37.6 41.4 45.4 49.5 53.9
    Foreign 42.5 48.0 54.2 60.8 67.8 75.1 82.8 90.7 99.1 107.8
Aid requirements (D - C) 266.4 295.0 326.9 361.7 398.1 436.3 476.5 518.9 563.9 611.9
A.  Total revenue (excluding grants) 10.0 10.1 10.1 10.2 10.2 10.3 10.3 10.4 10.4 10.4
B.  Total expenditure (1+2+3+4) 25.6 25.4 25.2 25.1 25.0 24.9 24.8 24.8 24.8 24.8
    1.  Spending on goods and services 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.1
         Maintenance 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6
        Other spending on goods and services 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5
    2.  Wages and salaries 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.7
    3.  Investment (public investment program) 5.2 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.5
        Health 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
        Infrastructure 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1
        Education 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
        Other 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
    4.  Interest payments 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
        Domestic debt 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
        Foreign debt 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
C.  Overall fiscal balance, excluding grants (A - B) -15.5 -15.3 -15.1 -14.9 -14.7 -14.6 -14.5 -14.4 -14.4 -14.4
D.  Borrowing 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
       Domestic 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
       Foreign 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Aid requirements (D - C) 12.5 12.3 12.1 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.4 11.4
Memorandum items
Aid requirements (in millions of US dollars) 504.2 558.4 618.8 684.6 753.5 825.8 901.9 982.3 1067.5 1158.3
Aid requirements per capita (in US dollars) 38.8 41.6 44.7 47.8 51.0 54.1 57.2 60.3 63.4 66.6
Aid requirements (% of total revenue) 124.8 122.0 119.3 117.0 114.8 113.0 111.5 110.4 109.6 109.0
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.7
Total public investment (% of aid requirements) 41.5 40.8 40.4 40.2 40.1 40.0 40.0 40.0 39.9 39.9
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 20.3 19.8 19.3 19.1 18.8 18.7 18.5 18.4 18.4 18.3
   Health (% of public investment) 17.7 17.8 17.8 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.3 18.4
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 64.9 65.1 65.3 65.7 66.0 66.3 66.6 66.9 67.2 67.4
   Education (% of public investment) 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.5
   Other (% of public investment) 6.7 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.7
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.3 9.5
External debt (% of GDP) 54.5 50.7 47.4 44.8 42.6 41.0 39.7 38.7 37.9 37.4
(In percent of GDP)
Years
(In billions of current CFA francs)
Table 2
Niger: Illustrative Medium-Term Budget Framework and Aid Requirements, 2006-15
(Constant effective tax rates)1990 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poverty rate (2003 = 63)
(% of the population living below $2 per day) 63.0 1/
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 63.0 61.8 60.5 59.2 58.0 57.0 56.0 55.1 54.4 53.7
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 62.9 60.5 57.9 55.5 53.3 51.4 49.6 48.1 46.7 45.5
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.5 62.8 59.1 55.4 52.0 48.9 46.2 43.8 41.8 40.0 38.5
   Ravallion's (2004) adjusted elasticity (Gini = 50.5) 62.9 60.1 57.3 54.6 52.1 50.0 48.1 46.4 44.9 43.6
Literacy rate 11.4 20.3 21.1 22.0 22.8 23.6 24.4 25.1 25.8 26.4 27.0
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality (2002=155) 191 150 145 140 136 132 128 125 122 120 118
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition (2000=40.1) 42.6 2/ 40.6 40.1 39.5 38.9 38.3 37.8 37.3 36.8 36.4 36.0
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age)
Life expectancy (2002 = 46.2) 42.1 46.9 47.2 47.5 47.9 48.2 48.5 48.8 49.0 49.3 49.5
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water (2000=59) 53.0 58.1 58.5 58.9 59.3 59.7 60.1 60.4 60.7 61.1 61.4
(Percentage of population with access to safe water)
COMPOSITE MDG INDICATOR (2005 = 100) 102.1 104.5 107.0 109.6 112.1 114.4 116.6 118.6 120.5 122.2
(A rise denotes an improvement)
Aid and external debt indicators
   Foreign aid (in % of GDP) 12.5 12.3 12.1 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.4 11.4
   Aid (in % of total government revenue) 56.0 55.4 54.8 54.3 53.9 53.4 53.1 52.9 52.7 52.5
   External debt (in % of GDP) 54.5 50.7 47.4 44.8 42.6 41.0 39.7 38.7 37.9 37.4
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of GDP) 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of exports) 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3
Note: The “adjusted” elasticity formula proposed by Ravallion (2004) is -9.3*(1-Gini)^3 = -1.13 where Gini index is 50.5 for Niger. 
Malnutrition prevalence is in % of children under 5.
1/ The observation year is 1993.
2/ The observation year is 1992. 
Projections
Table 3
Niger: MDG Indicators, Illustrative Public Investment Program, 2006-15
(Constant effective tax rates)2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
A.  Total revenue (excluding grants) 213.4 262.6 318.5 380.0 445.6 514.5 556.0 599.1 644.4 692.1
B.  Total expenditure (1+2+3+4) 543.5 601.0 660.7 720.4 777.7 832.2 895.1 962.3 1034.0 1110.9
    1.  Spending on goods and services 339.7 377.9 417.0 455.4 491.8 526.0 567.4 611.6 658.5 708.6
         Maintenance 30.5 34.8 39.3 43.7 48.1 52.4 57.1 62.1 67.5 73.3
        Other spending on goods and services 309.2 343.0 377.7 411.7 443.7 473.6 510.3 549.5 591.0 635.3
    2.  Wages and salaries 81.9 91.6 101.6 111.5 121.2 130.4 140.1 150.4 161.3 172.9
    3.  Investment (public investment program) 110.6 119.5 129.4 140.1 150.5 160.7 171.5 183.3 196.1 210.1
        Health 19.6 21.3 23.1 25.1 27.1 29.1 31.2 33.5 36.0 38.7
        Infrastructure 71.8 77.8 84.6 92.0 99.3 106.5 114.2 122.6 131.7 141.7
        Education 11.8 12.6 13.6 14.5 15.4 16.2 17.0 17.9 18.9 19.9
        Other 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.5 8.7 8.9 9.1 9.3 9.5 9.8
    4.  Interest payments 11.4 12.0 12.7 13.4 14.2 15.1 16.0 17.1 18.1 19.3
        Domestic debt 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.4
        Foreign debt 10.2 10.6 11.1 11.7 12.2 12.9 13.6 14.3 15.1 15.9
C.  Overall fiscal balance, excluding grants (A - B) -330.1 -338.5 -342.2 -340.5 -332.1 -317.8 -339.1 -363.3 -389.7 -418.8
D.  Borrowing 63.8 70.8 78.0 85.0 91.6 97.7 105.3 113.4 122.0 131.1
    Domestic 21.3 23.6 26.0 28.3 30.5 32.6 35.1 37.8 40.7 43.7
    Foreign 42.5 47.2 52.0 56.6 61.0 65.1 70.2 75.6 81.3 87.4
Aid requirements (D - C) 266.4 267.7 264.2 255.5 240.5 220.0 233.8 249.8 267.7 287.7
A.  Total revenue (excluding grants) 10.0 11.1 12.3 13.4 14.6 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8
B.  Total expenditure (1+2+3+4) 25.6 25.5 25.4 25.4 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 25.4 25.4
    1.  Spending on goods and services 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.1 16.1 16.1 16.2 16.2 16.2 16.2
         Maintenance 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
        Other spending on goods and services 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5 14.5
    2.  Wages and salaries 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
    3.  Investment (public investment program) 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8
        Health 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
        Infrastructure 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2
        Education 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
        Other 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
    4.  Interest payments 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
        Domestic debt 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
        Foreign debt 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
C.  Overall fiscal balance, excluding grants (A - B) -15.5 -14.3 -13.2 -12.0 -10.9 -9.8 -9.7 -9.6 -9.6 -9.6
D.  Borrowing 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
       Domestic 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
       Foreign 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Aid requirements (D - C) 12.5 11.3 10.2 9.0 7.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.6
Memorandum items
Aid requirements (in millions of US dollars) 504.2 506.7 500.2 483.7 455.3 416.5 442.6 472.9 506.7 544.6
Aid requirements per capita (in US dollars) 38.8 37.8 36.1 33.8 30.8 27.3 28.1 29.0 30.1 31.3
Aid requirements (% of total revenue) 124.8 101.9 83.0 67.2 54.0 42.8 42.1 41.7 41.5 41.6
Real GDP per capita at market prices (% change) 3.4 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1
Total public investment (% of aid requirements) 41.5 44.7 49.0 54.8 62.6 73.0 73.4 73.4 73.3 73.0
Public investment (% of total public expenditure) 20.3 19.9 19.6 19.4 19.4 19.3 19.2 19.0 19.0 18.9
   Health (% of public investment) 17.7 17.8 17.8 17.9 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.3 18.4
   Infrastructure (% of public investment) 64.9 65.1 65.3 65.7 66.0 66.3 66.6 66.9 67.2 67.4
   Education (% of public investment) 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.4 10.2 10.1 9.9 9.8 9.6 9.5
   Other (% of public investment) 6.7 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.7
Domestic debt (% of GDP) 8.0 8.2 8.4 8.7 9.1 9.5 9.8 10.1 10.4 10.7
External debt (% of GDP) 54.5 51.6 49.3 47.8 46.8 46.3 45.5 44.7 44.1 43.5
(In percent of GDP)
Years
(In billions of current CFA francs)
Table 4
Niger: Illustrative Medium-Term Budget Framework and Aid Requirements, 2006-15
(increasing effective direct tax rate)1990 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Poverty rate (2003 = 63)
(% of the population living below $2 per day) 63.0 1/
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -0.5 63.0 62.2 61.3 60.5 59.9 59.3 58.5 57.7 57.0 56.3
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.0 62.9 61.3 59.6 58.1 56.8 55.7 54.1 52.7 51.4 50.3
   Consumption per capita growth elasticity of -1.5 62.8 60.3 57.9 55.6 53.8 52.3 50.1 48.1 46.3 44.7
   Ravallion's (2004) adjusted elasticity (Gini = 50.5) 62.9 61.0 59.2 57.4 56.0 54.8 53.1 51.5 50.1 48.8
Literacy rate 11.4 20.3 21.1 22.0 22.8 23.6 24.4 25.1 25.8 26.4 27.0
(% of educated labor in total population)
Infant mortality (2002=155) 191 150 147 143 140 138 135 132 130 127 125
(Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births)
Malnutrition (2000=40.1) 42.6 2/ 40.6 40.2 39.8 39.4 39.1 38.7 38.3 37.9 37.5 37.2
(Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age)
Life expectancy (2002 = 46.2) 42.1 46.9 47.1 47.3 47.6 47.8 48.0 48.2 48.5 48.7 48.9
(Life expectancy at birth, years )
Access to safe water (2000=59) 53.0 58.1 58.4 58.8 59.1 59.4 59.7 60.0 60.3 60.7 61.0
(Percentage of population with access to safe water)
COMPOSITE MDG INDICATOR (2005 = 100) 102.1 103.9 105.9 107.8 109.5 111.0 112.9 114.7 116.4 118.0
(A rise denotes an improvement)
Aid and external debt indicators
   Foreign aid (in % of GDP) 12.5 11.3 10.2 9.0 7.9 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.6
   Aid (in % of total government revenue) 56.0 50.9 45.7 40.5 35.3 30.2 29.8 29.7 29.6 29.6
   External debt (in % of GDP) 54.5 51.6 49.3 47.8 46.8 46.3 45.5 44.7 44.1 43.5
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of GDP) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
   Interest payments on external public debt (in % of exports) 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1
Note: The “adjusted” elasticity formula proposed by Ravallion (2004) is -9.3*(1-Gini)^3 = -1.13 where Gini index is 50.5 for Niger. 
Malnutrition prevalence is in % of children under 5.
1/ The observation year is 1993.
2/ The observation year is 1992. 
Projections
Table 5
Niger: MDG Indicators, Illustrative Public Investmebt Program, 2006-15
(increasing effective direct tax rate)